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INTRODUCTION

In Harris v. Quinn, a divided U.S. Supreme Court held that the
1
First Amendment’s free speech and free association clauses
prohibited an Illinois labor union from collecting agency fees from
2
non-unionized in-home personal care assistants. To reach this
holding, the Court concluded that its landmark case Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education was not applicable to Harris and applied only to
3
cases that involved employees employed solely by the state.
This Note begins with a brief history of the constitutionality of
4
collective bargaining agency fees in the United States. It then
addresses the key facts of Harris and outlines the arguments made
5
in the majority and dissenting opinions. In analyzing the Court’s
6
holdings in Harris, this Note deduces that: (1) Abood should have
been controlling, and that the Harris Court improperly
7
distinguished Abood; (2) the majority’s conclusion would have
8
been appropriate in the absence of Abood; (3) instead of
distinguishing Abood, the Court should have overturned it as
unconstitutional and relied instead on Pickering v. Board of
9
Education; and (4) overturning Abood would not unduly or
10
unjustifiably aggravate existing agency shop case law. Finally, this
Note concludes that the Court’s decision in Harris was a product of
a result-oriented, policy-driven judiciary, and that the decision not
to overturn Abood serves to further crystalize Abood’s
11
unconstitutional holding in common law.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Harris v. Quinn (Harris III), 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
3. Id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977)).
4. See infra Part II. For a more detailed look at the history of agency shop
provisions in the United States, see Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency
Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61 (1983) (illustrating the expansion of agency shop
legislation).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Section IV.A.
8. See infra Section IV.B.
9. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), abrogated in part by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006); see infra Section IV.C.
10. See infra Section IV.D.
11. See infra Part V.
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II. HISTORY
American jurisprudence has had a long and turgid history
12
when it comes to agency shop provisions. The Court’s decision in
Abood, the landmark case upon which the Harris Court relied, stems
from precedent set predominantly by two earlier U.S. Supreme
13
Court cases: Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson
and
14
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street. Because Hanson and Street
provide the precedential background for Abood, “[a]nalysis of the
contemporary boundaries of private sector agency shop provisions
15
must start with those two cases.”
A.

Railway Labor Act Cases

The Railway Labor Act, passed in 1926, was one of the United
16
States’ first labor laws. Unions and railways alike had grown tired

12. For the purposes of this Note, agency shop provisions are clauses in
collective bargaining agreements assessing fees to non-union members. See Rob
McKenna & Geoffrey William Hymans, Other People’s Money, 9 J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y
PRAC. GROUPS 111, 111 (2008) (“In an ‘agency shop’ state, public employees do
not have to belong to a union but they must still pay a fee, known as an ‘agency
shop fee,’ to the union to support its collective bargaining activities. In a ‘right to
work’ state, public employees typically are not required to belong to a union or to
pay agency shop fees.”).
13. Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
14. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742 (1961).
15. Cantor, supra note 4, at 66. The history of pre-Abood agency shop
jurisprudence presented here is necessarily brief. The Court’s 1977 ruling in Abood
was its first foray into the uncharted territory of agency shop law; prior to Abood, its
only related rulings were on union shop clauses. See Milton L. Chappell, From
Abood to Tierney: The Protection of Nonunion Employees in an Agency Shop; You’ve
Come a Long Way, 15 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988) (“In 1977, the Supreme Court
ruled for the first time on the constitutionality of agency shop requirements in the
public sector.”).
16. It is not quite accurate to say that the Act was “[o]ur first national labor
law.” William E. Thoms, Collective Bargaining Under the Railway Labor Act, 20 TRANSP.
L.J. 275, 275 (1992). The Act had several unsuccessful predecessors in the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the Arbitration Act of 1888, and the Erdman
Act of 1898. See Fernando A. Ruiz, Labor Law—The Railway Labor Act: The Employee’s
Right to Minority Union Representation at Company-Level Grievance Hearings, 11 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 27, 31–33 (1989). It may be more accurate to say that the Railway
Labor Act was the first successful labor law, satisfactory both to laborers and to
railways. See Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway Labor Act—Time For Repeal?, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 442 (1990) (“Following a series of laws dating back to
the 1880s that neither unions nor carriers found satisfactory, railway management
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of the arbitration requirements associated with early federal labor
laws, and the nation turned instead to the collective bargaining
approach to conflict resolution promulgated by the Railway Labor
17
Act. To facilitate collective bargaining, the Act was amended in
18
1951 to include a union shop provision, permitting collective
bargaining agreements between railway carriers and unions to
19
mandate employee unionization for all area railway employees.
Hanson and Street arose from disputes over this legislation.
In Hanson, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad Company
brought a suit against a Nebraska labor union, seeking enjoinder of
20
the union’s application of a union shop agreement enforced via
21
the Railway Labor Act. The employees claimed that the union
shop agreement came into conflict with a provision of the Nebraska
22
Constitution. At the time of Hanson, the Nebraska Constitution
and unions agreed upon a bill that embodied the collective bargaining system
developed prior to World War I. This was . . . the Railway Labor Act of 1926.”).
17. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926); Ruiz, supra note 16, at 35
(“The Railway Labor Act primarily emphasized collective bargaining for the
settlement of labor-management disputes and provided for mandatory mediation
only if bargaining failed. The Act invoked arbitration only when both parties
agreed.”).
18. Union shop provisions facilitate collective bargaining by eliminating the
problem of individuals benefiting from the bargaining process without paying
union fees, known as “free ridership.” See W.W.A., Annotation, Deduction or
Collection of Labor Union Dues from Wages of Employees, 135 A.L.R. 507 (1941) (stating
that union shop laws “serve[ the] substantial public interest of preventing
union[s] . . . from being undermined by tolerating free riders, i.e., those who
would enjoy benefits of union negotiating efforts without assuming a
corresponding portion of union financial burden”).
19. The 1951 amendment created a schism in the Act’s formerly unified
devotees. The union shop provision was not popular among smaller unions as it
allowed railway workers who move to a new location to maintain their membership
of their old union as long as it was “national in scope.” Northrup, supra note 16, at
447.
20. The term “union shop agreement” in this Note is used to describe an
agreement where “employees of [a] company would be required to become
members of the successful union as a condition of retaining their
employment . . . .” E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Closed Shops and Closed Unions, 160
A.L.R. 918 (1946). Union shop agreements differ from agreements with agency
shop provisions in that agency fees do not require employees to join a union, but
merely require the employee to pay certain union fees. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
21. Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 227–28 (1956).
22. Id. at 228. At first blush, there is an apparent supremacy problem: the
Railway Labor Act is a federal act, and should supersede Nebraska Law. U.S.
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23

had banned union shop agreements. But the Railway Labor Act,
as amended in 1951, contained a union shop clause stating that,
notwithstanding any state or federal law to the contrary, “[a]ny
[railroad carrier] and a labor organization . . . shall be permitted
. . . to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued
employment, that . . . all employees shall become members of the
24
labor organization representing their craft or class.” In response
to First Amendment arguments raised by the plaintiff railroad
25
employees, the Court held that the Railway Labor Act presented
“no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment
rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is
26
required to be a member of an integrated bar.” However, the
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution is “the supreme law of the
land”). Employee-plaintiffs circumvented this issue, inter alia, by condemning the
Railway Labor Act as unconstitutional of the First Amendment. Brief for Robert L.
Hanson, et al., Individual Appellees at 22, Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (No. 451), 1956
WL 88889, at *22–24.
23. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228. Nebraska was a “right-to-work” state at the time
of Hanson, making union shop agreements inherently violative of Nebraska law. See
McKenna & Hymans, supra note 12, at 111.
24. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
25. The majority opinion in Harris dismissed Hanson’s relevance, claiming
that Hanson “barely mentioned” the First Amendment. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618,
2627 (2014). However, it seems that Court’s decision in Hanson revolved primarily
around the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, as the First Amendment was the
topic of the bulk of the opinion. See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236–38.
26. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. In doing so, the Court overturned the Nebraska
Supreme Court, which stated that federal enforcement of union shop agreements
violated private individuals’ right to work and freedom to contract under the Fifth
Amendment due process clause. Hanson v. Union P.R. Co., 71 N.W.2d 526,
541–42 (Neb. 1955). This seemingly Lochnerian opinion is somewhat
anachronistic—while the Nebraska Supreme Court gives a nod to West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, one of several cases that heralded the end of laissez-faire Lochner
jurisprudence, the Court still relied on freedom of contract and right-to-work,
mainstays of the Lochner Era courts. See id. at 690 (citing W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)). For background on Lochner Era jurisprudence, see
Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (“[I]n the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, judges concerned about protecting big business from the nascent
regulatory state departed from the norm of restraint and substituted their values
for the principles that the Constitution’s framers enshrined and John Marshall
enforced. In this deviant period, known as the Lochner era, the Court
underconstrued the scope of congressional power and overprotected private
property.”).
For background on how Parrish heralded an end to the Lochner Era, see
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Court noted the narrowness of the holding, explaining that Hanson
does not apply where “fee[] . . . assessments [are] used as a cover
for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention
27
of the First Amendment.”
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, like Hanson, involved
the application of a union shop clause under authority of the
28
Railway Labor Act. The plaintiff-employees in Street also filed suit
based on First Amendment freedom of speech and free association
claims, seeking enjoinder of the enforcement of the union shop
29
agreement.
Unlike Hanson, however, the plaintiff railway
employees in Street claimed that their union dues were being “used
to finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices
whom [they] opposed, and to promote the propagation of political
and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which [they]
30
disagreed.” The Court opted out of answering the constitutional
Ronald A. Parsons & Sheila S. Woodward, The Heart of the Matter: Substantive Due
Process in the South Dakota Courts, 47 S.D. L. REV. 185, 190 (2002) (“The deciding
turn from heightened scrutiny may well have occurred with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, in which the Court
rediscovered its deferential roots in order to uphold a minimum wage law . . . .”);
Id. at 211 (“The United States Supreme Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish is largely credited with tossing some of the final shovels of earth down upon
the Lochner era of heightened scrutiny in federal substantive due process
jurisprudence.”).
27. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. While the Court echoed Hanson’s distinction
between ideological and non-ideological union spending in Abood, the Court in
Harris posited that it is better to distinguish instead between private and public
sector union spending (disallowing agency shop fees in the latter). Compare Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (“[A] union cannot
constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not
germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.”), with Harris III, 134
S. Ct. at 2633 (“Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the
practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify publicsector union expenditures as either ‘chargeable’ . . . expenditures for ‘collectivebargaining’ . . . or nonchargeable . . . expenditures for political or ideological
purposes.” (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 232)).
28. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742 (1961).
29. See id. at 742–45; Brief for Appellees, S.B. Street, Nancy M. Looper, Hazel
E. Cobb, J.H. Davis, Mrs. Edna Fritschel, Mrs. Elizabeth Ferguson, and Others
Similarly Situated at 63, Street, 367 U.S. 740 (No. 4), 1960 WL 98527, at *63.
30. Street, 367 U.S. at 744. Plaintiffs claimed that the fees were used “for
purposes other than the negotiation, maintenance, and administration of
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and . . . other conditions of employment
[such as] . . . to support ideological and political doctrines and candidates which
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question posed, positing that “[w]hen the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question . . . it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
31
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Instead, the
Court ruled that the Railway Labor Act did not allow unions to
spend dues collected through the union shop clause on political
activities, and thus avoided answering the constitutional question of
32
whether the Act was in violation of the First Amendment.
B.

Abood v. Board of Education

Street and Hanson provided the precedential backdrop that led
to the Court’s landmark decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education. Abood, the central authority referenced in Harris, involves
a Michigan statute that allows a union to enter into an agency shop
33
agreement with the state. Unlike in Street and Hanson, the union
in question in Abood represented a group of public employees—
34
school teachers—as opposed to private railway workers. However,

plaintiffs . . . are . . . not willing to support voluntarily.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v.
Street, 108 S.E.2d 796, 800 (Ga. 1959).
31. Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
32. Id. at 770. While the Court in Abood maintained the doctrine that unions
are precluded from spending agency shop and union shop fees on political
activities, some scholars dispute the distinction between political and non-political
spending. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 4, at 70–71 (“Forced payments to a service
organization by all who benefit from the service do not significantly impinge on
associational or speech interests, even if the beneficiary organization uses a
portion of the extracted fees to support political or ideological causes opposed by
some payors. . . . [S]o long as the organization is legally bound to use the funds to
promote the related functions and goals of the organization, then the disgruntled
fees payor cannot complain any more than the taxpayer whose funds are used by
the government for programs ideologically offensive to the taxpayer.”).
33. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211. For the purposes of this Note, “agency fees” and
“fair share fees” are used interchangeably. There is in reality a minor difference:
while the cost of agency fees is generally calculated as a percentage of the cost of
union dues paid by members, “[a] fair share provision defines the pro rata costs of
the union’s services rather than union dues. This fee can be more or less than
dues.” Elizabeth M. Bosek, Annotation, Agency Shop; Payment of “Fair-Share” by NonMembers, 18 IND. L. ENCYC. LAB. REL. § 22 (2015). This difference is insignificant
enough that the Harris court also uses the terms interchangeably. See Harris III, 134
S. Ct. 2618, 2633 (2014) (“The PLRA contains an agency-fee provision , . . .
[l]abeled a “fair share” provision . . . .”).
34. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211–12.
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unlike the union shop clause in the Railway Labor Act, the agency
shop clause in Abood does not actually require employees to join
the union—it merely requires employees to contribute to the
collective bargaining process through the payment of fair share
35
fees.
Abood arose when Michigan public school teachers filed a class
action suit against the union assigned to represent them in
36
collective bargaining. The plaintiffs claimed that the union
impermissibly infringed upon their First Amendment right to
37
freedom of association when it included an agency shop clause in
38
its collective bargaining agreement. This agency shop clause
required even non-union members to pay collective bargaining fees
39
to the union. The Abood Court held that the reasoning applied in
Hanson and Street also applied in the case of public employees,
stating that “[t]he desirability of labor peace is no less important in
the public sector [than in the private sector], nor is the risk of ‘free
40
riders’ any smaller.” Parroting the reasoning in Street, the Court
held that union expenditures “on behalf of political candidates, or
toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane
to its duties as collective-bargaining representative” must be
“financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not
coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of
35. Id. at 211. The Court did not actually use the term “fair share fees” in the
decision, but noted that non-union members “must pay to the union, as a
condition of employment, a service fee equal in amount to union dues.” Id.
36. Id. at 212. In its examination of collective bargaining rights, this Note
relies on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of collective bargaining: “Negotiations
between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to
determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and
fringe benefits.” Collective Bargaining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
37. Plaintiffs’ complaint also charged the union with violating state law
prohibiting public-sector agency fees and violating plaintiffs’ state free association
rights as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213. The
Court’s discussion of the First Amendment claim subsumes its discussion of the
other claims, and thus they are not addressed here in detail.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 211. The plaintiffs argued that the union participated “in a number
and variety of activities and programs which are economic, political, professional,
scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve” and that
“sums required to be paid under [the] Agency Shop Clause are used and will
continue to be used for the support of such activities and programs.” Id. at 213.
40. Id. at 224.
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41

governmental employment.” Nevertheless, the Court determined
that agency shop fees are allowable for “collective bargaining
42
activities.”
C.

The Aftermath of Abood

While many cases after Abood have considered agency shop law,
these subsequent cases focus on determining on what unions are
allowed to spend agency shop fees, not on determining the legality
of the fees overall. But while the law concerning the legality of
agency shop provisions did not change significantly between Abood
43
and Harris, it is worth addressing significant agency shop cases
following Abood to illustrate the complex legal dilemmas
precipitated by its holding. Thus, the following is a summary of the
case law engendered by Abood.
In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, the
Court attempted to delineate some rules regarding allowable and
44
non-allowable expenditures of agency shop fees. The Court ruled
that the test to determine whether an expenditure is allowable is
“whether the challenged expenditure[] [is] necessarily or
reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an
41. Id. at 235–36.
42. Id. at 236.
43. See Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 861 (1989) (“Because of the procedural posture of the appeal in
Abood, Justice Stewart declined to define precisely the dividing line between
permissible and unconstitutional charges.”); Gerald D. Wixted, Agency Shops and
the First Amendment: A Balancing Test in Need of Unweighted Scales, 18 RUTGERS L.J.
833, 838 (1987) (“Abood thus removed any constitutional barriers to the existence
of an agency shop in the public sector . . . . Since Abood, legislatures and courts
have tried several methods in an effort to strike the proper balance between the
union and the individual.”).
44. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984)
(noting that the Abood Court did not “define the line between union expenditures
that all employees must help defray and those that are not sufficiently related to
collective bargaining to justify their being imposed on dissenters”). Note that Ellis
was a Railway Labor Act case, and thus did not directly concern agency shop fees.
See id. at 435. But because Ellis relied so heavily on justification from Abood and
because the agency shop and union shop agreements are so similar in concept,
Ellis is often seen as agency shop law. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 43, at 868 (“The
treatment of litigation expenses in Ellis illustrates how the agency shop’s role in
reconciling the conflicting first amendment interests of union members and
objecting fee payers can justify forcing objectors to subsidize some ideological
activities.”).
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exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
45
employer on labor-management issues.”
But even this seemingly straightforward standard produced
disparate, arbitrary results. In Ellis for instance, the Court applied
the above standard to social activities at union events and ruled that
such activities qualified as allowable expenditures, reading the
46
standard of “necessarily or reasonably incurred” expenses broadly.
But just seven years later, the Court ruled in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass’n that union expenditures on public relations were not
allowable under the Ellis standard, reading the standard far more
47
narrowly.
Problems also arose in determining how unions should
consider and resolve claims of non-union members objecting to
union spending of agency shop fees. The Court first addressed this
48
issue in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson. Hudson arose
from several non-unionized teachers’ claims against their exclusive
49
bargaining representative, the Chicago Teachers Union. The
teachers claimed that the union had adopted an unconstitutional
method of responding to non-member objections to union
50
spending of agency fees. The Court held that “the constitutional
requirements for the Union’s collection of agency fees include an
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt
opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in
51
dispute while such challenges are pending.” This standard seems
to comport with Abood’s requirement that agency fees must prevent
“compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who
52
object thereto.”

45. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.
46. Id. at 449 (“While [social activities] are not central to collective
bargaining, they are sufficiently related to it to be charged to all employees.”).
47. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991). Note that
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority on this
point, stating that public relations expenditures should be allowable, providing
further evidence that Ellis’ standard produced varying interpretations. Id. at 534
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
49. Id. at 297.
50. Id. at 295.
51. Id. at 310.
52. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977).
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The twenty-first century, however, heralded the end of the
Hudson standard. In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n, the
53
Court reconsidered the standard. While the Court did not
explicitly reverse Hudson, it indicated that union spending of
agency fees is more constitutionally acceptable when non-members
are given the opportunity to positively ratify the union’s spending
54
choices prior to the spending taking place. Several years later, in
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, the Court further called
the Hudson standard into doubt, ruling that when agency fee dues
increase, “the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may
not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative
55
consent.” Knox is significant in that it was the first case to require a
union to ask non-members to affirmatively “opt-in” to agency fee
expenditures instead of merely allowing non-members to “opt56
out.”
In sum, post-Abood agency shop cases have been litigated
primarily on two subjects: (1) the constitutionality of particular
union expenditures of agency shop fees; and (2) the
constitutionality of systems put in place by unions through which
dissenting non-members can object to union spending of agency
fees. A clear, universally acceptable standard has yet to be found for
57
the adjudication of these issues.

53. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
54. See id. at 184 (“The notion that this modest limitation upon an
extraordinary benefit violates the First Amendment is, to say the least,
counterintuitive.”). The Court also expressed doubts about Abood and agency fees
in general, stating that it is “undeniably unusual for a government agency to give a
[union] the power, in essence, to tax government employees.” Id.
55. 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012). The Court also pointedly expressed its
doubts about opt-out spending in general: “Although the difference between optout and opt-in schemes is important, our prior cases have given surprisingly little
attention to this distinction. Indeed, acceptance of the opt-out approach appears
to have come about more as a historical accident than through the careful
application of First Amendment principles.” Id. at 2290.
56. This ruling was controversial. See, e.g., Deborah Prokopf, Public Employees
at the School of Hard Knox: How the Supreme Court Is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a
History Lesson, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1363, 1395 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s
decision in Knox is a breathtaking display of judicial activism by the far-right wing
of the Court, which calls into question the future of public-sector unionism in the
United States.”) (footnote omitted).
57. Though no universal standard has been set, there is a significant trend
toward anti-unionization, demonstrable through the cases discussed in this Part.
Abood, a 9-0 opinion in favor of public-sector agency shop agreements, seems to
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III. THE HARRIS V. QUINN DECISION
A.

Factual Background
58

Medicaid, a federal health care program, provides funding to
several states for state-run, in-home care programs for the elderly
59
and the ill. States use part of the federal funding to compensate
60
the personal assistants (PAs) who provide care to the customers.
Illinois, one such state funded by Medicaid, operates an in-home
care program called the Illinois Department of Human Services
61
Home Services Program (home care program).
In 2003, by executive order, Illinois made Service Employees
International Union Healthcare Illinois and Indiana (SEIU) the
62
exclusive union representative for the home care program’s
63
employees. The SEIU’s collective bargaining agreement with the
state included an agency shop provision that required non-member
have been the pinnacle of union support in the U.S. Supreme Court. Since Abood,
rightward movement in the Court and resulting case law have catalyzed a shift
away from the public-sector agency shop, toward right-to-work rulings. See id. at
1372 (“While Abood is representative of the ‘new’ model of public-sector labor
relations prevalent at its time, Knox plainly reflects the anti-union backlash of
recent years. An examination of the key public-sector union dues cases leading up
to Knox shows this disturbing evolution in the Court’s jurisprudence.”).
58. See About Us, MEDICAID, http://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/about
-us.html (last visited May 25, 2016).
59. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014); Home & Community Based Services,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By
MEDICAID,
-Topics/Long-Term-Services-and-Supports/Home-and-Community-Based-Services
/Home-and-Community-Based-Services.html (last visited May 25, 2016).
60. See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2624.
61. See id. at 2623; Home Services Program, ILL. DEP’T HUM. SERVS., http://
www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=29738 (last visited May 25, 2016).
62. The Governor of Illinois at the time was Rod Blagojevich, who notably
had several dealings with the SEIU. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Union Is Caught
Up in Illinois Bribe Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008
/12/12/us/politics/12union.html; Kris Maher & David Kesmodel, Illinois Scandal
Spotlights SEIU’s Use of Political Tactics, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2008), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB122973200003022963. For some, this connection
between Blagojevich and the SEIU called into question the propriety of the
appointment of the SEIU as the exclusive union representative. See Sean Higgins,
New Questions Raised About Decision to Let SEIU Represent Illinois Home Health Care
Workers, ILL. POL’Y (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/news
/new-questions-raised-about-decision-to-let-seiu-represent-illinois-home-health-care
-workers.
63. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
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PAs to pay a fair share fee to contribute to collective bargaining
64
costs.
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA), which
authorizes collective bargaining and the collection of fair share
65
fees, applies only to state employees. Thus, to cover the PAs, the
PLRA was amended to specify that the PAs are employees of the
state “[s]olely for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois
66
[PLRA].” Accordingly, under Illinois law, PAs who care for
customers through the home care program are employees both of
67
the state and of the customer. The state compensates the PAs, but
the customers are responsible for most other employment-related
duties, including the hiring, firing, training, and discipline of the
68
PAs.
In 2010, three home care program PAs, Theresa Riffey, Susan
Watts, and Stephanie Yencer-Price (Petitioners), filed a class action
on behalf of home care program PAs of the Northern District of
69
Illinois against the Governor of Illinois and the SEIU. Petitioners
contended that the fair share provision unconstitutionally abridged
70
their First Amendment rights to freedom of association and
71
freedom of speech and sought an injunction against the
64. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.)
(“When a collective bargaining agreement is entered into with an exclusive
representative, it may include in the agreement a provision requiring employees
covered by the agreement who are not members of the organization to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process.”); Harris, 134
S. Ct. at 2625. Note that, in accordance with Abood, the provision does not require
non-unionized employees to contribute financially to all union activities. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
65. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2625.
66. Id. at 2649 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 2646.
68. Id. at 2624. But see infra Section IV.A (discussing evidence of some state
control of employment-related duties).
69. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. Harris v. Quinn (Harris I), No. 10-cv-02477, 2010 WL 4736500, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010). The First Amendment claims in Hanson, Street, Abood, and
Harris are similar. Concerning free association, the plaintiffs in these cases
contended that forced unionization or forced support of a union “deprives . . .
employees of their freedom of association.” Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225, 230 (1956). In Abood and prior agency shop cases, the validity of free speech
claims was a more contentious issue. In his concurrence in Abood, Justice Powell
departed from the majority in his comment that prior cases did not support the
conclusion that “withholding of financial support from a union’s political activities
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72

enforcement of the agency shop provision. The District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division dismissed all
73
counts of the complaint with prejudice, and the Seventh Circuit
74
Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part. The Seventh Circuit
held that precedent set by Abood and similar cases allowed state
employees to be compelled to financially support collective
bargaining representation without running afoul of the First
75
Amendment. The court further noted that the State of Illinois was
properly designated as the PAs’ employer, as it holds “extensive
76
control over the terms and conditions of employment.” The U.S.
77
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B.

Majority Opinion
78

The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, addressing several
issues brought by Respondents SEIU and Illinois Governor Pat
Quinn on appeal. Primarily, the Court stated: (1) Abood should not
be extended to the instant case; and (2) the employment question
in the instant case does not pass the balancing test set out in
Pickering v. Board of Education.
is a type of ‘speech’ protected against governmental abridgment by the First
Amendment.” Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring). However, in Harris and later cases, it is uncontested that withholding
financial support from a union is speech, and the issue is not discussed in the
holding. Accord Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012)
(“Closely related to compelled speech and compelled association is compelled
funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups.”).
72. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
73. Harris I, 2010 WL 4736500, at *32.
74. Harris v. Quinn (Harris II), 656 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). The district
and intermediate courts also ruled on a ripeness issue. When the case arose, in
addition to the plaintiffs in the instant case, a second group of plaintiffs, also PAs,
but from a different division of the home services program (the Division of
Developmental Disabilities), were a party to the suit. Harris I, 2010 WL 4736500, at
*1. The district court dismissed their claim with prejudice as unripe, and the court
of appeals reversed in part, ruling that the dismissal should have been without
prejudice because it did not appear “beyond a doubt that there is no way the
plaintiffs’ grievance could ever mature into justiciable claims.” Harris II, 656 F.3d
at 701. However, because the disability program PAs are not a party to the instant
case, this detail is of little significance.
75. Harris II, 656 F.3d at 697.
76. Id. at 699.
77. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2627.
78. Id. at 2644.
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Distinguishing Abood

First, the Court distinguished Abood from the instant case,
observing that the employees in Abood were “full-fledged public
79
employees,” while employees in the instant case were state
80
employees solely for the purpose of collective bargaining. To this
point, the Court argued that Abood does not apply to cases involving
81
employees employed by more than one employer. The Court also
noted that extending Abood’s holding to cover the instant case
would be inefficient; because the state has so little control over the
PAs, their potential for achieving results through collective
82
bargaining with the state is greatly diminished.
Because Abood was distinguishable, the Court determined that
an independent examination of the law’s consistency with the First
83
Amendment was appropriate. The Court applied the strict
scrutiny standard and held that the fair share provision in the
instant case “does not serve a ‘compelling state interes[t] . . . that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms,’” and thus, that the provision does not
84
comport with the First Amendment.
2.

The Pickering Balancing Test

Pickering v. Board of Education established that for matters of
public concern, speech of public employees is protected under the
First Amendment where the interests of the public employee “in
commenting upon matters of public concern” outweigh the
interest of the state “in promoting the efficiency of the public
85
services it performs through its employees.” If the Pickering test
79. Id. at 2634.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2634–35.
82. Id. at 2636.
83. Id. at 2639.
84. Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289
(2012)). The Harris Court merely demonstrated that “the speech compelled in this
case is not commercial speech.” Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2639. Despite its
proclamation that “no fine parsing of levels of First Amendment scrutiny is
needed” to decipher the proper standard to apply, it is unclear how the Court
arrived at strict scrutiny. Id.
85. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), abrogated in part by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006). Pickering arose when a public school teacher was fired after he
published a letter chastising the local school board for their alleged misallocation
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applied here, and if the interest of the state in promoting efficient
labor outweighed the interest of the PAs in refraining from
association with the union, the PAs’ speech would not be protected
under the First Amendment. However, the Harris Court reasoned
that Pickering did not excuse the state’s use of fair share fees in the
instant situation because: (1) Pickering only applied to cases where
the state takes a “traditional employer role”; and (2) the interest of
the employees here outweighed the interest of the state in
86
promoting efficiency.
C.

Dissenting Opinion

The four member dissent, authored by Justice Kagan, stood
with the Seventh Circuit and mirrored its reasoning in several ways.
Primarily, the dissent argued that: (1) the majority had no reason
to distinguish Abood and that Abood should control; and (2) even in
the absence of Abood, the petitioners’ claim does not pass the
Pickering balancing test.
1.

Abood as Controlling Precedent

Justice Kagan argued primarily that the Seventh Circuit was
87
sound in its conclusion that Abood controls in the instant case.
First, the dissent argued, the state, as an employer, held enough
control over the PAs that the collective bargaining and fair share
fees allowed in Abood could logically be extended to the present
88
case. Second, the dissent rebutted the majority’s conclusion that
Abood cannot be applied in instances where employees have more

of funds. Id. at 564. The teacher filed suit, claiming that the First Amendment
protected his publication of the letter. Id. at 565. The Court established the
aforementioned balancing test when it upheld the teacher’s claim, finding that
the teacher’s interest in writing a letter on a matter of public concern outweighed
the school’s interest in promoting efficiency. Id. at 574–75.
86. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2642–43. The majority was adamant that Pickering
does not apply in Harris. However, when it states that even if Pickering applied, the
employees’ speech would be protected, the Court fails to address Garcetti. Garcetti
states that First Amendment free speech does not protect employee speech “made
pursuant to [the employee’s] official responsibilities.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 411.
Thus, it is possible that an employee’s refusal to support his or her collective
bargaining union’s activities is “speech” related to the employee’s official
responsibilities, in which case such speech would be unprotected under Garcetti.
87. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2644–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2645.
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than one employer, contending that there is no precedent
89
indicating “that joint public employees are not real ones.” While
the dissent conceded that the question of whether the state is an
actor’s employer is not answered merely by examining the label the
90
state chooses to use for that actor, the dissent claimed that the
state had “sufficient stake in, and control over, the petitioners’
terms and conditions of employment to implicate Abood’s rationales
91
and trigger its application.”
2.

Pickering as Controlling Precedent

The dissent next posited that applying Abood to the instant case
created results that comport with the law set out in Pickering. Justice
Kagan began her analysis by pointing out that Abood gets at largely
the same issue as Pickering, and that “its core analysis mirrors
92
Pickering’s.” Both Abood and Pickering address “the extent of the
government’s power to adopt employment conditions affecting
93
expression.”
The dissent then asserted that the line drawn in Abood between
acceptable and unacceptable infringements on free speech and
free association came from Pickering. Justice Kagan noted that “[o]n
the one side, Abood decided, speech within the employment
relationship about pay and working conditions pertain[ed] mostly
to private concerns and implicate[d] the government’s interests as
employer; thus, the government could compel fair-share fees for
94
collective bargaining.” This followed Pickering’s rationale that
95
speech of little public concern can be restricted. The dissent
contrasted this with state employee speech in political campaigns,
which “relates to matters of public concern and has no bearing on
the government’s interest in structuring its workforce,” observing
96
that “compelled fees for those activities are forbidden.”

89. Id. at 2648.
90. Id. at 2649; see also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 679
(1996) (stating that employment status with the state is not “dependent on
whether state law labels a government service provider's contract as a contract of
employment”).
91. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2649 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2654.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
96. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2654 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Necessity of Abood in Current Law

The dissent, like the majority, expressed its sentiments on
97
Abood in extensive dicta. Justice Kagan came out staunchly in favor
of Abood, chiding Justice Alito’s “gratuitous dicta critiquing Abood’s
foundations” and commenting that the majority’s unwillingness to
overturn Abood is the “one aspect of [the] opinion [that] is cause
98
for satisfaction.” The dissent commented that Abood “is deeply
entrenched, and is the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but
thousands of contracts between unions and governments across the
99
Nation,” and that it is a “foundation stone of the rule of law.”
While its comments on Abood did not directly inform its holding,
the dissent may have used its approval of the case to justify applying
100
it in Harris.
IV. A DEEPER LOOK INTO HARRIS V. QUINN: HOW HARRIS
HIGHLIGHTS THE FLAWS OF ABOOD
This Note will now argue that Abood should have been
controlling in Harris, and that the Court distinguished Abood as a
pretense to achieve their desired legal outcome. Next, it will show
that without Abood, the Harris majority’s ruling would have been
proper under Pickering. Finally, it will argue that instead of merely
critiquing Abood in dicta, the Harris Court should have overturned
Abood as unconstitutional.
A.

Abood is Controlling

As Justice Kagan flatly stated at the beginning of her dissent,
101
“Abood . . . answers the question presented in this case.” The
majority attempts to distinguish Harris from Abood in a variety of
ways, but ultimately, Abood addressed the same issue as Harris:
97. For the Court’s criticism of Abood, see id. at 2632–34. For the dissent’s
opinion on Abood, see id. at 2645–46.
98. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2645.
99. Id. at 2645, 2651 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct.
2024, 2036 (2014)).
100. In a similar manner, the majority used its disapproval of Abood to justify
distinguishing it: “Because of Abood’s questionable foundations, and because the
personal assistants are quite different from full-fledged public employees, we
refuse to extend Abood to the new situation now before us.” Id. at 2638 (majority
opinion).
101. Id. at 2644–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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whether an agency shop fee could be enforced for non-union
102
public employees. Nonetheless, it is worth addressing some of the
majority’s major reasons for distinguishing Abood.
First, the majority contends that Abood is distinguishable
103
because the PAs in Harris are only nominally “state-employees.”
The majority reasoned that since “the customer has virtually
complete control over” the PAs, the bargaining power of the PAs
104
with respect to the state would be diminished. The Court stated
that “[i]f we allowed Abood to be extended to those who are not
full-fledged public employees, it would be hard to see just where to
105
draw the line.” But this conclusion fails both textually and
substantively.
In terms of the text of the case, Abood was never constrained to
106
“full-fledged” public employees in the first place. It merely held
that “a recognized [public] union may seek to have an agency-shop
107
clause included in a collective-bargaining agreement.”
The conclusion that the PAs are not full-fledged public
employees is also substantively inaccurate. While it is true that the
Illinois statute defines the PAs as state employees “[s]olely for the
108
purposes of coverage under the [PLRA],” employment status with
109
the state is not defined by “state law labels.” The Illinois statute
and the majority opinion in Harris dramatically understated the
110
role of the state in the PAs’ employment; Illinois controls the PAs
in several meaningful ways. The state “sets all the workforce-wide
111
terms of employment.”
It pays wages, benefits, and health
insurance; establishes qualifications; sets baseline requirements for
102. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225 (1977).
103. See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2634–35 (“Illinois withholds from personal
assistants most of the rights and benefits enjoyed by full-fledged state
employees.”).
104. Id. at 2637.
105. Id. at 2638.
106. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the major point of contention in Abood was
that the employees required to pay the agency shop fees were public employees,
and were thus employed by an intrinsically political organization. Abood, 431 U.S.
at 227; see supra Section II.B.
107. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224.
108. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2405/3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
109. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 679 (1996).
110. See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2634 (“[P]ersonal assistants are almost entirely
answerable to the customers and not to the State.”).
111. Id. at 2646 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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service; and structures the relationship between the customer and
112
the PA. When the customer and the PA draft a service plan, along
with the customer and the PA, a state-employed counselor attends
113
the drafting process. The amalgamation of these factors provides
for more than enough state control to make unionization and
114
collective bargaining worth the employees’ time.
The majority also argued that there is a difference between
unwillingly funding private speech and unwillingly funding public
115
speech, which is more often political in nature. While this may be
a strong policy argument, Abood expressly addressed and dismissed
this point when it stated that “[t]he differences between publicand private-sector collective bargaining simply do not translate into
116
differences in First Amendment rights.”
Without explicitly
overturning Abood, this policy argument holds no precedential
117
weight.
In sum: (1) the PAs in Harris are clearly state employees both
substantively and under the text of Illinois law; and (2) the policy
arguments the majority made to the contrary lack even a scintilla of
precedential support. The reality of the situation, uncommented
upon by the Harris majority, but painfully clear, was that Justice
Alito and the Court’s four other most conservative justices did not
want to rule in favor of collective bargaining, and distinguished
118
Abood as a legal veneer for their result-oriented conclusion.
112. Id. at 2646–47.
113. Id. at 2647.
114. It seems that a disjointed workforce, such as the one in the instant case,
where PAs are working in private homes and do not communicate regularly, would
benefit more from collective bargaining, not less, as the majority claims. See id. at
2635 (majority opinion); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 312, Westlaw (database updated
Dec. 2015) (“The ultimate purpose of a collective-bargaining agreement is a
common understanding on the terms and conditions of labor.” (emphasis added)).
115. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2632.
116. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
117. Stare decisis dictates that the Court’s prior rulings—and not its policy
arguments provided in dicta—on a given question of law form legal precedent.
E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Applicability of Stare Decisis Doctrine to Decisions of
Administrative Agencies, 79 A.L.R.2d 1126 (1961); see also Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“While stare decisis is not an inexorable command,
particularly when . . . interpreting the Constitution, even in constitutional cases,
the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure
from precedent to be supported by some special justification.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
118. The advancement of unionization and collective bargaining is generally
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The Majority’s Ruling Is Sound in the Absence of Abood

Without Abood as controlling precedent, the majority’s ruling is
correct. Absent a case like Abood that specifically rules on the
constitutionality of the infringement of public employees’ First
Amendment rights, determinations of the First Amendment rights
119
of public employees are made using the Pickering balancing test.
For matters of public concern, an employee’s “interest as a citizen
in making public comment must be balanced against the State’s
interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public
120
services.”
The Pickering analysis begins with a determination of whether
121
the speech in question pertains to a matter of public concern. A
public employee “must accept certain limitations on his or her
122
freedom,” and, as the Court has stated, “When a public employee
speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead
as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the

seen as a liberal agenda in American politics. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as
Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 450, 455 (1981) (“[T]he development of collective bargaining law is
paradigmatic of all public policy in liberal capitalism.”); The Battle to Bring
Entitlements Under Control, 28 NO. 11 EMP. ALERT 3 (2011) (“A prominent
manifestation of the . . . switch from liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans
. . . is the move . . . to end collective bargaining by public employees.”). More
specifically, Justice Alito, author of the Harris majority, has stated that the
“aggressive use of power by the SEIU to collect fees from nonmembers is
indefensible.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2288, 2291 (2012).
119. Note that Pickering does not specifically address free association, but in
the instant case it is enough to merely address the issue of free speech, as the
association in question—association with a labor union—is only contested as it
relates to compelled speech. Free speech and free association rights “are
interrelated, because First Amendment rights of freedom of association derive
from constitutional rights of freedom of speech,” and thus, “there is no First
Amendment right to associate in order to engage in forms of speech that are not
protected by the First Amendment.” Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets:
Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods,
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 566 (2006).
120. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). There always exists
the possibility that Pickering could be found not to protect speech under Garcetti.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text. But as neither the Court nor the union
mentioned Garcetti in the above context, it is not useful for this Note to consider
the matter thoroughly.
121. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
122. Id.
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most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
123
Public concern is determined by considering the
forum.”
124
“content, form, and context of a given statement.”
The speech of unions in the collective bargaining process is a
125
matter of public concern. The mere fact that a government
employee is speaking on an issue that may implicate public
spending does not mean the speech itself is a matter of public
126
concern. The public spending, in this case, is spending on
Medicaid. In a 2014 study, only 1% of Americans had “no opinion”
127
on whether they were satisfied with Medicaid.
As of 2009,
expenditures for Medicaid constituted 2.7% of the United States’
gross domestic product, and Medicaid enrollment consisted of
128
“about one of every five persons in the [United States].” Clearly,
Medicaid spending is an issue that affects numerous Americans in
129
significant ways and is a matter of great public concern. Thus,
123. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
124. Id. at 147–48.
125. The dissent in Harris takes the opposite stance: that collective bargaining
is not a matter of public concern. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642 (2014).
However, the majority notes: “This argument flies in the face of reality . . . [as] the
category of union speech that is germane to collective bargaining unquestionably
includes speech in favor of increased wages and benefits for personal assistants.”
Id.
126. Id. at 2655 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has never come close to
holding that any matter of public employment affecting public spending . . .
becomes for that reason alone an issue of public concern.”).
127. Frank Newport, Most Americans Remain Satisfied with Healthcare System,
GALLUP (June 16, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171680/americans
-remain-satisfied-healthcare-system.aspx?g_source=Medicaid&g_medium=search
&g_campaign=tiles.
128. CHRISTOPHER J. TRUFFER ET AL., 2010 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL
OUTLOOK
FOR
MEDICAID
i–iii
(2010),
https://www.cms.gov
/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads
/MedicaidReport2010.pdf.
129. The concept that congressional spending is a matter of public concern is
so fundamentally ingrained in U.S. democracy that it is difficult to provide
authority for the statement other than polling data. Chief Justice Roberts
attempted a trim definition of “public concern” in Snyder v. Phelps, writing that
“speech is of public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). Chief Justice Roberts noted
in his definition that “[a] statement’s arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial
character . . . is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
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having established public concern, it is appropriate to proceed with
the Pickering balancing test.
The next step is determining how the public employees’
interest, as citizens, in making public comment balances against the
state’s interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public
130
While the state normally has a strong interest in
services.
enforcing the agency fee provisions—as exclusive union
representation promotes labor stability—the instant case is slightly
131
different. Labor stability is not a major concern because, as the
Harris Court mentioned, “the [PAs] do not work together in a
common state facility but instead spend all their time in private
132
homes, either the customers’ or their own.” The PAs’ interest in
speaking on a matter of public concern is great when measured
against the government’s meager interest in promoting labor
stability amongst PAs who never see each other. If the PAs were
private employees, the only compelled speech of public concern
would be the support of collective bargaining. However, since the
PAs are compensated through federal Medicaid funding, by forcing
PAs to contribute to collective bargaining for increased wages, for
instance, the state compels the PAs to support the expansion of
133
Medicaid.

concern.’” Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 378 (1987)).
130. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
131. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220–21 (1977) (citing
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67–70 (1975); S.
REP. NO. 573, at 13 (1935)) (asserting that use of a single representative “avoids
the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more
agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment,” which
“prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and
eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization” and “frees the
employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions,
and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements
that are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations”) (citation omitted).
132. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2014) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 51 (1983)).
133. See id. at 2642 (“Increased wages and benefits for personal assistants
would almost certainly mean increased expenditures under the Medicaid
program.”).
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The Harris Court Should Have Overturned Abood

Despite the majority’s extensive critique of Abood, the Court
134
failed to overturn Abood in Harris. This was a mistake, as: (1)
Abood unconstitutionally infringes on public employees’ right to
First Amendment free speech; and (2) the enforcement of Abood
creates myriad administrative difficulties.
1.

Abood Is Unconstitutional

The key difference between Abood and Pickering, and the
reason that Pickering is justified under the First Amendment while
135
Abood is not, is Pickering’s use of a balancing test. While Abood did
not utilize a balancing test, opting for a universal declaration that
“the government’s own interests ‘constitutionally justified’ the
136
interference” with state employees’ free speech,
Pickering
required that the government’s interest in efficient labor actually
137
outweigh the employees’ interest in free speech. Thus, when
situations like that in Harris arise where a balancing test determines
that constraints on free speech violate the First Amendment, Abood,
as precedent, unconstitutionally waives the balancing test.
Beyond Harris, there are numerous other situations where
Abood unconstitutionally infringes on free speech. Part of the
reason why Abood runs into so many constitutional problems is that
it deals with public employees. Public employees are employed by
the government and any collective bargaining deals intrinsically
with political speech. Both Abood and the dissent contend that
“[n]othing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its
meaning makes the question whether the adjective ‘political’ can
properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional
134. The Court certainly considered overturning Abood. According to the
dissent, “The petitioners devoted the lion’s share of their briefing and argument
to urging us to overturn that nearly [forty]-year-old precedent. . . . Today’s
majority cannot resist taking potshots at Abood . . . but it ignores the petitioners’
invitation to depart from principles of stare decisis.” Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
135. See supra Section III.B.2.
136. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2646 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood, 431
U.S. at 222).
137. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing public
employees’ interest, as citizens, in making public comment against the State’s
interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public services); see also supra
Section III.B.2.
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138

inquiry.” This assertion is, frankly, astonishing. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held numerous times that this is not true. In the seminal
case Boos v. Barry, the Court invalidated legislation proscribing
political speech, holding that the United States has a “‘profound
national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues
139
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”
2.

Abood Creates Administrative Concerns

In addition to its constitutional issues, Abood establishes
precedent that is rife with administrative difficulties. These
difficulties come primarily from the unclear standard that Abood
sets out.
The majority covered many of the public policy issues in its
140
opinion; primarily, the policy goal, as stated earlier, is to ensure
that agency fees do not create “compulsory subsidization of
141
ideological activity.”
But this is, administratively, a difficult
standard to enforce.
Abood allows agency fees to go toward “union expenditures that
are made for collective-bargaining purposes,” but not toward
142
expenditures “made to achieve political ends.” In cases of private
employees, it would be easy to distinguish these two goals because
funding for collective bargaining would go to the employer, while
political funds would go to the state. But in cases of public
employees, the state is the employer, and making the distinction is
143
much more difficult.
138. Abood, 431 U.S. at 232; Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2644–45 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“Abood . . . answers the question presented in this case.”).
139. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205
(2003) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976), superseded by statute,
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81;
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)) (suggesting that among the
forms of speech to which “the constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its
fullest and most urgent application” are “the discussion of political policy
generally [and] advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation”), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (summarizing
a party’s argument that constraints on political speech “constitute restraints on
First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct”).
140. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
141. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977).
142. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2632.
143. See id. at 2632–33 (“In the private sector, the line is easier to see.
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As the majority points out, many courts have struggled with
144
this issue. The Court in Ellis took an expansive view of the Abood
standard by stating that agency fees could go toward “the expenses
of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to
implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive
145
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.” But in
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, just seven years later, the Court
narrowed the holding again, stating that fees could not go to
“lobbying activities [that] relate not to the ratification or
implementation of a dissenter’s collective-bargaining agreement,
but to financial support of the employee’s profession or of public
146
employees generally.”
Not only do these cases demonstrate
disparate interpretations of Abood, they also fail to clarify its
holding. What expenses can be “reasonably employed to
implement or effectuate the duties” of a union? The Court’s
inability to clarify the Abood standard speaks further to the
imprecision of this standard in the first place.
Thus, as demonstrated, the Court had two reasons to overturn
Abood. First, Abood unconstitutionally infringes on First Amendment
rights. Second, Abood is immensely difficult to administratively
enforce.
D.

Abood Can Be Overturned Because It Is Not “Super Precedent” and
Its Absence Will Not Harm Present Law

In response to the majority opinion’s criticism of Abood, the
dissent argued that the majority’s reluctant decision to let Abood
stand was correct, and that Abood cannot be overturned because of
147
extensive union reliance on its holding. While it is true that many
states and unions have relied on Abood in collective bargaining
148
agreements, this argument is not persuasive.
Collective bargaining concerns the union’s dealings with the employer; political
advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government. But in the public sector,
both collective-bargaining and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the
government.”).
144. See supra Section III.B.
145. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984).
146. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991); see supra Section
II.C.
147. See supra Section III.C.3.
148. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2645 (“The Abood rule is deeply entrenched, and is
the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but thousands of contracts between
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This idea of incontrovertible precedent is aptly termed “super
149
precedent” in the academic community. Super precedent consists
of “those constitutional decisions in which public institutions have
heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently supported over
150
a significant period of time.” They are decisions that “are deeply
embedded into our law and lives through the subsequent activities
151
of the other branches.”
The dissent’s argument is unpersuasive, partially because the
debate over whether super precedent is a valid legal concept is far
from over; many legal scholars disapprove of a heightened level of
152
precedential value. The debate over the value of super precedent
is a complex topic, and the intricacies of the argument cannot be
contained within the scope of this Note. Thus, this Note will
address the primary flaw in the dissent’s reasoning: Abood is not
entrenched deeply enough into the legal system to be construed as
super precedent.
“A case that can credibly be characterized as a super precedent
is distinctive in part because it is so deeply engrained in
constitutional law that it cannot be reconsidered—much less
153
overturned—without considerable excavation.”
An obvious
example is Marbury v. Madison, perhaps the first case to which every
154
new constitutional law student is exposed. Abood is plainly not
such a case that can be characterized as “super precedent.” The
dissent stated that Abood is the source of authority for “thousands of
155
contracts between unions and governments across the Nation.”
unions and governments across the Nation.”).
149. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204
(2006).
150. Id. at 1205.
151. Id.
152. For some common arguments, see Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a
Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232
(2006).
153. Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1222.
154. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury established judicial review, hinted at the
political question doctrine, and is bound to the very fabric of American
jurisprudence as we know it. Id. at 154. Like Abood, Marbury has not been without
its fair share of controversy. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original
Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
329, 329 (“Marbury v Madison has come to draw argument as a cornflower draws
bees.” (internal quotation omitted)). Unlike Abood, however, Marbury is part and
parcel of American common law.
155. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2645 (2014).
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The dissent did not provide support for this figure, but even if it is
accurate, the statistic does not provide the rootedness that is
156
necessary to establish super precedent. The vast majority of
contracts the dissent cited would be valid even without Abood under
157
Pickering.
The jurisprudential discord Abood left behind is also evidence
that Abood does not have the unifying precedential effect necessary
158
to proclaim it super precedent. In Abood’s wake lies a string of
divergent decisions, both over when union spending of agency fees
is allowed and over methods of contesting the spending of such
159
fees. The standard for qualification as super precedent is lofty,
requiring a fairly unified stream of case law relying on the original
160
case. Surely a case producing such discrepant results as Abood
161
does not qualify. Overturning Abood would undoubtedly cause
some turbulence, likely inducing non-union employees to sue their
unions on the premise that their agency fee contracts were
162
unconstitutional. But mere fear of political or legal turbulence
does not justify super precedent treatment: super precedent, as
shown, is reserved for those pinnacles of institutional reliance that
163
Abood does not yet reach.

156. Gerhardt, in his discussion of super precedent, regales readers with an
explanation of why even a monumentally significant case like Miranda v. Arizona
does not rise to the level of super precedent. Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1218.
(“The difficulty with characterizing Miranda as a super precedent is that the
Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions weakening (some say,
eviscerating) Miranda. While the decision endures symbolically in the public
consciousness, it does not endure with the same robustness it first had.”).
157. Harris is an unusual case in that the group of workers attempting to
unionize is made up almost exclusively of PAs that work from home, causing a
situation where the government has a diminished interest in labor peace, swinging
the Pickering balancing test more in favor of individuals. See generally Harris III, 134
S. Ct. 2618. Because of this, supporting agency shop fees in Harris via the Pickering
analysis is more difficult than it would be in cases concerning unified workforces
where the government has a stronger interest in labor peace. See supra Section
III.B.2.
158. See supra Section II.C.
159. See supra Section II.C.
160. Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1205–06.
161. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Section III.B.
163. Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1205.
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V. CONCLUSION
In sum, this Note draws three primary conclusions. First, the
majority erred in distinguishing Abood from Harris. Abood plainly
covers within its scope the situation in Harris, and Harris is not
distinguishable. Second, this Note concludes that in the absence of
Abood, under the Pickering balancing test, the majority’s argument is
solid, and the Illinois law is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. Finally, this Note concludes that the majority erred in
failing to overturn Abood. Abood, in its failure to use a balancing test,
unconstitutionally infringes upon public employees’ First
Amendment rights.
The negative outcomes of this decision are twofold. First, the
manner in which the Harris decision was made is in and of itself a
negative outcome. The outcome of Harris was determined by the
political leanings of Justices, backed not by the letter of the law, but
164
by a loose, policy-based analysis of cases. Abood clarified that the
role of determining the merits of collective bargaining belonged to
Congress, and not to the judiciary. While the Abood Court
recognized that “‘[m]uch might be said pro and con’ about the
union shop as a policy matter,” it reaffirmed in its opinion that “it is
Congress that is charged with identifying ‘[t]he ingredients of
165
industrial peace and stabilized labor management relations.’”
Abood should have been controlling, but a result-oriented court
166
distinguished it in a sui generis manner.
The second, more significant consequence is that by criticizing
Abood in dicta but not overturning it, the Court is giving further
unwarranted credence to Abood as super precedent and making it

164. See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). The fact that political interests
were involved is made apparent in the 5-4 split. The five-member majority
comprised the conservative core of the Court: Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy. Justice Kagan’s dissent was joined by her left-leaning
judicial compatriots, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer.
165. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 218 (1977) (quoting Ry.
Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233–34 (1956)).
166. The majority’s motivation for distinguishing Abood is clear, given the
torrential deluge of criticism Justice Alito leveled at Abood in both Harris and Knox.
See supra Section III.C.3; see also Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277,
2290–91 (2012) (complaining that “Abood . . . assumed without any focused
analysis that the dicta from Street had authorized the opt-out requirement as a
constitutional matter”).
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yet more difficult to overturn. Abood was an unconstitutional
judicial decision, and the Court—as a result of timidity and
unwillingness to overturn what they perceived to be a deeply rooted
judicial decision—allowed the bad precedent set by Abood to stand.
If super precedent is a false concept, then Abood should be
overturned on its merits; as demonstrated, Abood is an
unconstitutional decision that serves no present purpose other
168
than to spawn ever more incomprehensible legal standards. And
if super precedent indeed exists, if stare decisis is truly “an
inexorable command in constitutional adjudication,” the Court
should heed its own words. It is high time to reverse Abood, lest it be
169
borne inexorably into the annals of common law.

167.
168.
169.

See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section II.C.
Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1204.

